Amending the Amendment Procedures of Article V by Mazzone, Jason
MAZZONE 5.18.18 (DO NOT DELETE)  5/21/2018 3:46 PM 
 
 
AMENDING THE AMENDMENT 
PROCEDURES OF ARTICLE V 
JASON MAZZONE* 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
Section 1. At the next election for Members of the House of 
Representatives and then every twentieth year thereafter, the 
question “Shall there be a Convention for proposing Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States?” shall be submitted to 
the People of each State; and if in a majority of the several States 
the electors decide in favor of a Convention for such purposes, and 
a majority of the electors voting in the several States so decide, the 
Congress shall immediately call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments; and the electors of each State shall thereafter elect 
three delegates to convene on the first Tuesday of June next at the 
Capitol of the United States or in such other place in the District 
constituting the seat of Government of the United States as the 
Congress may direct, and shall continue their session until the 
business of such Convention shall have been completed. 
Section 2. No person shall be a delegate to said Convention who 
shall not have attained the age of eighteen years, and been five 
years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when 
elected, be an Inhabitant of the State for which chosen. No 
delegate shall, during the Time for which elected, hold any other 
office of trust of profit under the Authority of the United States or 
of the several States. 
Section 3. Every delegate shall receive for his or her services the 
same compensation annually payable to the members of the 
House of Representatives and shall be reimbursed for their 
expenses, while the Convention is in session, to the extent that a 
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Representative would then be entitled thereto in the case of a 
session of the Congress. 
Section 4. A majority of the Convention shall constitute a quorum 
for the transaction of business and no Amendment to the 
Constitution shall be submitted for approval to the States as 
hereinafter provided, unless by the assent of two-thirds of all the 
delegates elected to the Convention, the ayes and noes being 
entered on the journal to be kept. 
Section 5. The Convention shall determine the rules of its own 
proceedings, choose its own officers, and be the judge of the 
election, returns, and qualifications of its members and, by a two-
thirds vote, may suspend or remove any member for cause. In case 
of a vacancy, by death, resignation, removal, or other cause, of any 
delegate elected to the Convention, the executive authority of the 
State from which such vacancy occurs shall make a temporary 
appointment until the people of the State fill the vacancy by 
election as the legislature of the State may direct. The Convention 
shall have the power to appoint such employees and assistants as it 
may deem necessary and fix their compensation, to provide for the 
printing of its documents, journal, and proceedings, and to make 
provision for other expenses that said Convention may incur. The 
appropriation provisions of the Convention shall be self-executing 
and shall constitute a first claim on the Treasury of the United 
States. 
Section 6. Any proposed Amendment which shall have been 
adopted by such Convention shall be limited to a single subject, 
and shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this 
Constitution, when ratified by conventions in a majority of the 
several States, and from which at least two thirds of the total 
number of Representatives of the several States are derived; 
provided that no ratification by any of the several States of any 
proposed Amendment shall be valid if made less than twenty-four 
months following the adoption of the proposed Amendment by 
the Convention; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
Section 7. Upon the approval of such constitutional Amendments, 
in the manner provided in the last preceding section, such 
constitutional Amendments shall go into effect on the first day of 
January next after such approval. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of the United States is “famously difficult to 
amend.”1 Article V creates two routes by which amendments may be 
proposed: Congress may itself propose constitutional amendments by 
a two-thirds vote of both houses, or, if two-thirds of the state 
legislatures ask for it, Congress must call a convention for the purpose 
of proposing amendments.2 Ratification of proposed amendments 
requires approval by three-fourths of the states, either by vote of the 
state legislatures or state conventions (Congress determines which).3 
These super-majority requirements present formidable hurdles.4 Just 
thirty-three amendments have ever been proposed to the states for 
ratification and of these, only twenty-seven have been ratified.5 
Eleven of the twenty-seven amendments were adopted before the 
close of the eighteenth century; an additional four were adopted 
before the end of the nineteenth.6 
Opportunities for Americans to participate in drafting and 
ratifying provisions of their federal Constitution have, therefore, been 
few and far between. While the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was 
ratified on May 7, 1992, Congress had proposed it to the states as part 
of the Bill of Rights some 203 years earlier, on September 25, 1789.7 
 
 1.  Drew DeSilver, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution Seldom Go Anywhere, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/15/a-look-
at-proposed-constitutional-amendments-and-how-seldom-they-go-anywhere/. 
 2.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  This is not just a modern assessment. At the Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick 
Henry complained that under Article V, as a practical matter, “the way to amendment is . . . 
shut.” Statement of Patrick Henry (June 5, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d. 
1888). Besides the difficulty of proposing amendments, he argued, the requirements for 
ratification were too high: 
[W]hat is destructive and mischievous, is, that three fourths of the state legislatures, or 
of the state conventions, must concur in the amendments when proposed! In such 
numerous bodies, there must necessarily be some designing, bad men. To suppose that 
so large a number as three fourths of the states will concur, is to suppose that they will 
possess genius, intelligence, and integrity, approaching to miraculous. It would indeed 
be miraculous that they should concur in the same amendments, or even in such as 
would bear some likeness to one another; for four of the smallest states, that do not 
collectively contain one tenth part of the population of the United States, may 
obstruct the most salutary and necessary amendments. 
Id. at 49–50. 
 5.  See MICHAEL J. GARCIA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 49 
(2017) [hereinafter S. DOC. NO. 112-9]. 
 6.  See id. at 25–45 nn.1–19. 
 7.  Id. at 44–45 n.19. 
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Thus, it is the Twenty-Sixth Amendment that represents the most 
recent occasion on which Congress both proposed (on March 23, 
1971) and the states ratified (on July 1, 1971) a change to the 
Constitution.8 Accordingly, the only Americans alive today who have 
had a say in the proposal and ratification of any provision of our 
Constitution are those who were of voting age in 1971 (and thus today 
are in their mid-60s or older). Even these Americans have 
experienced the amendment process as a legislative—rather than a 
populist—endeavor. No amendments have ever been proposed by a 
convention because no national constitutional convention has met 
since the summer of 1787; and for all but the Twenty-First 
Amendment (ratified on December 5, 1933),9 ratification has occurred 
by the vote of state legislatures, not state-level conventions.10 
The difficulty of deploying Article V and its resulting rare usage 
have some important effects. Politics in the United States proceed as 
though the Constitution cannot ever be changed. Government 
representatives operate without threat that their powers could be 
curtailed or their decisions undone by constitutional amendment. 
More generally, problems in our political system have become 
immune to constitutional reform. However serious a deficiency may 
be, whatever the level of support for reform, amending the 
Constitution is not viewed as a viable option for improving the system 
of government. 
That the Constitution cannot be changed has also come to mean 
that it should not be changed. Large portions of the American public 
(and its leaders) view the Constitution in sacred terms, such that 
amending it is akin to sacrilege, and even talk of amendment raises 
suspicions of treachery.11 The lack of public experience with changing 
the Constitution through the procedures of Article V generates 
hostility towards ever doing so. 
Yet while Article V’s procedures have been shut off, the 
Constitution has not stagnated. Instead, with textual amendments 
 
 8.  Id. at 44 n.18. 
 9.  See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, supra note 5, at 38 n.13. 
 10.  JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2015, at 383 (2015). 
 11.  See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776-2015, at 188 (2016) (reporting that by the centennial of the Constitution, 
“Americans referred to the Constitution as ‘the Ark of the Covenant,’ Independence Hall as 
‘the holiest spot of American earth,’ and visitors to it as ‘pilgrims’ in ‘the spirit of worshippers 
before a shrine’”). 
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foreclosed, courts have gained power to adopt, in the name of 
constitutional interpretation, reforms they themselves view as 
desirable. Reading the Constitution, including its twenty-seven 
amendments, takes about thirty minutes. That exercise, however, 
would give a very incomplete understanding of the Constitution’s 
meaning at various historical periods, how the document has changed, 
and what it means today. To know those things requires doing what 
every American law student does when studying the Constitution: 
reading thousands of pages of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court 
(and lower courts). For instance, the Constitution protects the 
following rights: to marry a person of the same gender,12 to burn the 
American flag without being subject to punishment,13 to have a 
government-supplied attorney during police interrogations14 and at 
criminal trial,15 to send one’s child to a parochial school,16 to move 
from one state to another,17 to view pornography,18 to refuse medical 
treatment,19 to purchase and use contraception,20 and to obtain an 
abortion.21 None of these rights are mentioned in the text of the 
Constitution; none of them came about because the original 
document was amended to expand the roster of individual liberties. 
Instead, each of these rights has resulted from judicial interpretation 
of text that has remained immune to change. Woodrow Wilson might 
have exaggerated when he called the Supreme Court “a constitutional 
convention in continuous session”22 but Article III is a more likely 
route to constitutional change than is Article V. 
Constitutional change via judicial interpretation has a problematic 
relationship to Article V. Popular judicial rulings can fuel 
disinclination to make use of Article V: if the courts can keep us all on 
the right track, there is no need to gear up the amendment machinery. 
 
 12.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 13.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 14.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 15.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 16.  See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 17.  See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (“The right 
of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state . . . may be mentioned as 
some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the 
general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental.”). 
 18.  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 19.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 20.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 21.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 22.  Edward S. Corwin, Curbing the Court, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 45, 
49 (1936). 
MAZZONE 5.18.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2018  3:46 PM 
120 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:2 
When, as a result of the practices of judicial interpretation, the 
Constitution comes to be viewed as the domain of the courts (rather 
than of the people) and the province of judicial expertise, intervention 
through amendment can appear additionally problematic and 
undesirable. On the other hand, correcting an unpopular judicial 
ruling is all the more difficult when, as a result of a lack of use, the 
amendment procedures of Article V have gone rusty. Knowing this, 
courts can be ever more confident that changes they pursue through 
rulings on the meaning of the text will not be subject to reversal 
through the amendment process. Acquiescence to judge-led reforms 
on the part of political actors and the public leads to paralysis with 
respect to judicial rulings, even those that generate widespread 
criticism and opposition. 
There is little point in advocating constitutional amendments to 
address a defect in our structures of government or to alter the roster 
of existing protections for individual rights without first confronting 
the barriers of Article V and their resulting political and cultural 
impacts. This Article is thus directed at amending the amendment 
procedures of Article V itself. The amendment that this Article 
proposes requires periodically asking voters whether a constitutional 
convention should be held. Should voters approve holding a national 
convention, it would have power to propose amendments and state-
level conventions would decide whether to ratify the proposals. The 
amendment this Article offers provides a means for constitutional 
change that does not depend upon either Congress or the state 
legislatures, but also contains safeguards to ensure that any alterations 
to the Constitution reflect broad and sustained public support. The 
proposal also includes provisions for the composition and operation 
of the envisaged convention and the ratification process. 
Part I sets out the key features and benefits of the proposed 
amendment. Part II draws upon experiences at the state level with 
holding constitutional conventions, provides some lessons about how 
the proposal offered here would operate, and explains the attendant 
risks. Part III takes up some additional issues the proposal presents 
including the likelihood, in practice, that the new mechanism 
contemplated would actually generate constitutional reform and the 
risk also of a runaway convention producing too many or undesirable 
changes. 
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I. A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
This Part begins by setting out the key features of the proposed 
amendment. It then discusses the likely benefits of the proposal, 
which include democratizing the amendment process and enhancing 
our constitutional culture. 
A. Key Features 
Section 1 of the proposed amendment requires asking voters23 at 
the next federal election, and then in federal elections every twenty 
years thereafter, whether they favor holding a constitutional 
convention. If both a national majority of those voting favors a 
convention and a convention is favored in a majority of the states, 
then Congress is obligated to call the convention. The voters in each 
state must then elect three delegates to represent the state and 
convene in Washington, DC the following June. 
Sections 2 and 3 of the proposal discuss qualifications and 
compensation for convention delegates. Section 2 requires that 
delegates be eighteen years of age, citizens of the United States for 
five years, and inhabitants of the state they represent at the 
convention. Section 2 also prohibits delegates from holding other 
national or state offices while serving in the convention. For example, 
a Senator or Governor would be ineligible to serve as a delegate. 
Section 3 provides for delegates to receive a salary and expenses 
during the time of their service at the convention in the same manner 
as a U.S. Representative during a congressional session. 
Sections 4 and 5 specify the basic operations of the convention. As 
provided in section 4, a majority of delegates constitutes a quorum. 
Proposed amendments, however, require the approval of two-thirds of 
all convention delegates. Section 5 gives the convention power to 
determine its operating rules, choose its officers, resolve disputes over 
the qualifications of delegates, appoint staffers, and keep records, and 
it guarantees federal funding for convention expenses. At the same 
time, section 5 permits removal of a delegate for cause only upon a 
two-thirds vote by the convention members; the procedure for filling 
vacancies is also specified (the governor may make a temporary 
appointment until voters are able to elect a new delegate). 
 
 23.  Voters are called “electors” to track the language of Article I, section 2. 
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Section 6 specifies the process for ratification of proposed 
amendments.  Under section 6, a proposed amendment must be 
limited to a single subject and submitted to state ratifying 
conventions. Section 6 specifies that a majority of the states must 
approve the proposal and that the majority derive at least two thirds 
of the number of U.S. Representatives from all of the states. The latter 
provision serves as a proxy for population. With 435 Representatives 
from the states today,24 a proposed amendment would require 
ratification by at least 26 states with a combined total of at least 290 
Representatives. In addition, section 6 delays ratification at the state 
level for two years after the Convention itself approves an 
amendment. In other words, section 6 contains a built-in lag between 
proposal and ratification. Finally, section 7 specifies that ratified 
amendments take effect on the first day of the year after ratification. 
B. Benefits 
The proposed amendment has several interrelated benefits. The 
proposal creates an amendment process that is more democratic than 
those that Article V presently provides. It also ensures any resulting 
amendment is the product of sustained deliberation rather than hasty 
action. In addition, the proposal promotes a healthier constitutional 
culture than presently exists. 
1. Democracy 
A principal virtue of the proposal is that it democratizes the 
amendment process. Under the existing provisions of Article V, 
amending the Constitution depends upon the acquiescence of 
legislators both at the proposal and ratification stages. Proposal of an 
amendment requires action on the part of either Congress (by making 
the proposal) or the state legislatures (by calling a convention).25 
Ratification requires state legislative action or a decision by Congress 
to send the proposal to a state ratifying convention. Legislators, 
however, tend to disfavor amendments and conventions: they much 
prefer the status quo, particularly if their own powers are at risk.26 
 
 24.  See Apportionment Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 62–5, 37 Stat. 13. 
 25.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 26.  See Drew DeSilver, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution Seldom Go 
Anywhere, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/09/15/a-look-at-proposed-constitutional-amendments-and-how-seldom-they-go-
anywhere/ (reporting that “[s]ince 1999, 742 proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
have been introduced in the House or Senate” but that “only 20 times since 1999 have 
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This is true even though individual politicians routinely propose 
constitutional amendments—typically as a means of making a 
statement rather than to produce constitutional reform.27  Because 
Article V erects a legislative barrier, amendments have very little 
chance of success.28 
This Article’s proposed amendment to Article V thus creates a 
mechanism for amending the Constitution that does not depend upon 
the cooperation of federal and state legislatures. Instead, under the 
proposal, voters are able to decide for themselves whether a 
convention should be held; conventions at the state level are then 
responsible for ratification.29 The existing mechanisms of Article V 
allow for Congress to bypass the state legislatures: it can propose 
amendments and submit them to state conventions. Article V also 
allows the states to bypass Congress: the states themselves can call for 
a convention. The Constitution thus addresses the problem that 
Congress will naturally be reluctant to put forth amendments that 
diminish its own authority.30 But there is no mechanism to bypass 
 
amendments . . . been voted on by the full House or Senate”). Thus, for example, Congress is 
very unlikely to approve a balanced budget amendment—because the need to balance the 
budget would severely curtail the ability of members of Congress to deliver federally-funded 
benefits to their constituents—even though there is broad public support for such an 
amendment. Of course, legislators do not always act in a uniform way. For example, proposals 
to reform the electoral college have received support in the House but have faced opposition in 
the Senate. In 1989, the House approved by a vote of 338-70 a proposed amendment abolishing 
the electoral college and providing for direct popular election of the President. The proposal 
was filibustered in the Senate. See ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION? 87–88 (2002) (reporting on the fate of the 1989 electoral college proposal). 
 27.  See Mark V. Tushnet, Entrenching Good Government Reforms, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 873, 876–77 (2011) (“Politicians basically propose an amendment so that they can send 
out a press release, not so the Constitution actually will be amended. . . . [I]t is not actually a 
serious policy proposal from the politician’s point of view.”). 
 28.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 29.  In place of state ratifying conventions, there are arguably benefits to submitting 
proposed amendments to voters in each state in a referendum. As Professor Rappaport writes 
(in offering modifications to the Article V procedures for a convention of states): 
A proposed constitutional amendment might be ratified by a simple vote of the 
people, as are state constitutional amendments and other state laws in many states 
throughout the nation. While the ballot measure would certainly be an innovation for 
the Constitution, its wide use by the states makes it a familiar and tested device. Given 
modern communication methods, it seems reasonable to employ a direct vote of the 
people for the ratification decisions that the state conventions—which were said to act 
in the name of the people—make. 
Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention 
Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1563–64 (2010). 
 30.  As one delegate to the New York ratifying convention explained: 
The reason why there are two modes of obtaining amendments prescribed by the 
constitution I suppose to be this—it could not be known to the framers of the 
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both the state and the national legislatures: this Article’s proposal 
accomplishes exactly that.31 
2. Deliberation 
The proposed amendment ensures that any resulting amendments 
reflect sustained deliberation, not hasty action. It guards against the 
excessive populism that has generated criticism of amendment 
procedures at the state level and in some foreign systems.32 For a 
convention to be held, there must be support from a majority of the 
states as well as at the national level. For amendments the convention 
proposes to take effect, there must be support from a majority of the 
states and those states must represent a super-majority of the 
population (as measured by their proportion of Representatives in the 
House). 
By allowing voters to call for a convention only every twenty 
years, the proposal provides a mechanism for responding to long-term 
pathologies while minimizing the risk of its deployment in response to 
short-term problems. Delaying state ratification conventions for two 
years after the proposal of any amendment also serves to guard 
against hasty reforms. Likewise, while the two-thirds threshold for 
 
constitution, whether there was too much power given by it or too little; they 
therefore prescribed a mode by which Congress might procure more, if in the 
operation of the government it was found necessary; and they prescribed for the states 
a mode of restraining the powers of the government, if upon trial it should be found 
they had given too much. 
New York Assembly Debates (Feb. 4, 1789), in 23 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 2501, 2522 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino et 
al. eds., 2009). 
 31.  Adopting the proposal will likely be easier than adopting (in accordance with Article 
V’s provisions) most other possible amendments because the proposal does not itself contain 
any substantive change to the Constitution, only a new procedural mechanism for future reform. 
Nobody today could confidently predict if and when, in the future, voters will call for a 
convention or the nature of a future convention’s proposed amendments or their likelihood of 
ratification. Uncertainty, in this context, is a virtue, not a vice. 
 32.  Warning against amending the federal Constitution, Kathleen Sullivan has written: 
While the federal Constitution has been amended only 27 times in over 200 years, the 
fifty state constitutions have had a total of nearly 6,000 amendments added to them. 
They have thus taken on what Marshall called in McCulloch “the prolixity of a legal 
code”—a vice he praised the federal Constitution for avoiding. Many of these state 
constitutional amendments are products of pure interest-group politics. State 
constitutions thus are difficult to distinguish from general state legislation, and they 
water down the notion of fundamental rights in the process: The California 
constitution, for example, protects not only the right to speak but also the right to fish. 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, 23 AM. PROSPECT 20 (Fall 1995), 
http://prospect.org/article/constitutional-amendmentitis. 
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ratification is lower than the current Article V requirement,33 it 
remains high enough to avoid use of the amendment mechanism to 
cure merely local or transient problems. 
3. Constitutional Culture 
The proposed amendment offers broader benefits to our 
constitutional democracy. It will facilitate increased knowledge on the 
part of citizens about the Constitution and help bolster the 
Constitution’s claim to legitimacy. By asking citizens to consider 
periodically whether the Constitution currently serves them well or 
should be reformed, the proposed amendment encourages the spread 
of information about the Constitution and provides an occasion for 
conversation and debate around its provisions. Giving citizens an 
opportunity to affirm the Constitution in its existing form or to 
proceed to a convention will also mean the Constitution is no longer 
the product of past generations: it becomes instead the work of the 
living. 
Here, some peculiarities of our constitutional system bear 
emphasis. On the whole, Americans hold the Constitution in very high 
regard. In surveys they generally express opposition to making 
significant changes to the document.34 Levels of support do, however, 
vary among different demographic groups.35 There also exists a steady 
 
 33.  See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 34.  See, e.g., Aspen Ideas Festival, “Does the US Constitution Still Work for 21st Century 
America?” PENN SCHOEN BERLAND POLL (July 9, 2010), https://issuu.com/psbsrch/docs/aspen-
ideas-2010 (reporting that 60% of respondents took the view that the Constitution “is timeless 
and should be changed minimally” while only 32% answered that the document “needs 
significant updates” even while only 25% of respondents were satisfied with the way the 
government functions today and nearly 70% answered that “the Government today is 
functioning WORSE than intended” by the framers); Nicholas Stephanopoulos & Mila 
Versteeg, The Contours of Constitutional Approval, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 113, 138 (2016) 
(reporting that in a national survey asking people the extent to which they approve of the 
Constitution that it received an average approval score of 7.8 out of 10 and a median score of 9, 
whereas state constitutions received an average score of 6.7 out of 10 and a median score of 8, 
and concluding that “Americans strongly back their federal Constitution”); What We Love and 
Hate about America, THE HARRIS POLL (June 8, 2010), https://theharrispoll.com/new-york-n-y-
june-8-2010-a-new-harris-poll-measures-what-americans-think-about-the-united-states-or-more-
specifically-how-they-rate-16-elements-of-american-life/ (reporting that in response to the 
question, “How would you rate each of the following in the United States: Constitution?,” 33% 
responded “excellent,” 37% responded “pretty good,” 22% responded “only fair” and 8% 
responded “poor.”); 56% Think Constitution Should Be Let Alone, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (July 
2, 2013), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/june_2013/ 
56_think_constitution_should_be_left_alone (reporting that 56% of Americans believe the 
Constitution should be left alone; 33% support minor changes; 4% favor major changes; and 
2% call for scrapping the existing Constitution and starting over). 
 35.  See, e.g., Stephanopoulos & Versteeg, supra note 34, at 146–60 (reporting that 
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minority for constitutional reform,36 again with demographic 
variations.37 In addition, as discussed further in Part III, there exists 
considerable support for specific amendments. At the same time, the 
public’s knowledge about the actual provisions of the Constitution is 
quite low.38 Americans thus revere a document they do not know 
much about. 
In addition, even while Americans give the Constitution high 
marks, they take a dim view of the government that operates under it. 
Surveys show that “the overall level of trust in government” is “near 
historic lows,”39 that a majority of Americans are dissatisfied with the 
 
respondents who self-report higher knowledge about the Constitution and who follow the news 
more closely are more supportive of the Constitution; that support for the Constitution is lower 
among African Americans compared to other racial groups and lower among women than 
among men; that support rises with education and income and is higher also among older 
Americans than among younger Americans; and that Republicans rate the Constitution slightly 
higher than do Democrats). 
 36.  See, e.g., William D. Blake & Sanford V. Levinson, The Limits of Veneration: Public 
Support for a New Constitutional Convention, 1 CONST. STUD. 1, 10 (2016) (reporting on a 2011 
survey showing that one in three Americans favors a constitutional convention); Aspen Ideas 
Festival, supra note 34 (reporting 49% of respondents supported changes to the Constitution by 
popular referenda). 
 37.  Blake & Levinson, supra note 36, at 12–13 (reporting that “African Americans and 
Hispanics express significantly more support for a constitutional convention than whites;” that 
while 56% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 are more likely to support holding a 
convention, support drops to 20% amongst Americans aged 65 or older; and that support for a 
convention among Americans earning less than $20,000 a year is 41% but that among those who 
earn more than $150,000 a year the figure is only 21%).  
 38.  See, e.g., SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: 
OPINION SURVEYS AND THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 10–14 (2003) (summarizing evidence of 
voter ignorance); DANIEL R. DENICOLA, UNDERSTANDING IGNORANCE: THE SURPRISING 
IMPACT OF WHAT WE DON’T KNOW 6 (2017) (reporting survey evidence that a third of 
respondents could not name any First Amendment rights, that 42% believed the Constitution 
establishes English as the official language of the United States, and that 62% could not name 
the three branches of the federal government); RICK SHENKMAN, JUST HOW STUPID ARE WE?: 
FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE AMERICAN VOTER 24 (2008) (reporting that only 34% of 
Americans know Congress has power to declare war and only 35% know Congress can override 
a presidential veto of legislation; and that 49% of Americans believe the President can suspend 
the Constitution, 60% believe the President can appoint judges without Senate confirmation, 
and 45% believe the Constitution punishes revolutionary speech); AM. COUNCIL OF TR. AND 
ALUMNI, A Crisis in Civic Education (Jan. 2016), https://www.goacta.org/images/download 
/A_Crisis_in_Civic_Education.pdf; ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF PA., 
Americans Are Poorly Informed About Basic Constitutional Provisions (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-are-poorly-informed-about-basic-
constitutional-provisions; One in Three Americans Fail Immigrant Naturalization Civics Test, 
XAVIER UNIV. CTR. FOR THE STUD. OF THE AM. DREAM (April 27, 2012), 
https://www.xavier.edu/campusuite25/modules/news.cfm? seo_file=One-in-Three-Americans-
Fail-Immigrant-Naturalization-Civics-Test&grp_id=319#.Wo w_9ajwa70. 
 39.  See Public Trust in Government Remains Near Historic Lows as Partisan Attitudes 
Shift, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 3, 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/05/03/public-trust-
in-government-remains-near-historic-lows-as-partisan-attitudes-shift/ (reporting that “the 
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direction the country is taking,40 and that only a minority is satisfied 
with the way the nation is being governed.41  Congress and its 
members receive particular disapproval: “Congress engenders the 
lowest confidence of any institution that Gallup tests, and Americans 
rate the honesty and ethics of members of Congress as the lowest 
among 22 professions in Gallup’s [surveys].”42 In 2017, approval of 
Congress was only at 19% of those surveyed, making 2017 “the eighth 
consecutive year in which less than 20% of Americans have approved 
of Congress.”43 Current views towards both the Democratic and 
Republican parties are likewise at historic lows.44 “Dissatisfaction with 
government” tops the list of national problems respondents identify.45 
(Of all public institutions, the military has the strongest level of 
support.46 The Supreme Court also consistently receives higher marks 
than do the other branches of the federal government.47) Half of 
Americans even believe the federal government “poses an immediate 
threat to the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens.”48 In sum, we 
 
overall level of trust in government remains near historic lows; and that just 20% say they trust 
the government to do what’s right always or most of the time”). 
 40.  Id. (“By 66% to 30% more Americans say they are dissatisfied than satisfied with the 
way things are going in the country today.”). 
 41.  Jeffrey M. Jones, Frank Newport & Lydia Saad, How Americans Perceive Government 
in 2017, GALLUP (Nov. 1, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/221171 
/americans-perceive-government-2017.aspx. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Megan Brenan, 2017 Congressional Job Approval Average Remains Low, GALLUP 
(Dec. 14, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/223598/2017-congressional-job-approval-average-
remains-low.aspx. 
 44.  Jones, Newport & Saad, supra note 41. 
 45.  In a 2017 survey, “dissatisfaction with government” topped the list of national 
problems respondents identified, with 20% of Americans citing this as the most important 
problem the country faces; the next highest category was healthcare, cited by 10% of 
respondents. Frank Newport, Americans View Government as Nation’s Top Problem in 2017, 
GALLUP (Dec. 19, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/224219/americans-view-government-
nation-top-problem-2017.aspx. 
 46.  See Jim Norman, Americans’ Confidence in Institutions Stays Low, GALLUP (June 13, 
2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/192581/americans-confidence-institutions-stays-low.aspx 
(reporting that in 2016, 73% of respondents expressed “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of 
confidence in the military; the figure for Congress was 9%). 
 47.  In a 2017 poll, 49% of respondents voiced approval of the “way the Court is handling 
its job;” 52% of respondents expressed a “great deal” of confidence and an additional 16% 
expressed “a fair amount” of confidence in the Court. Historical Trends, Supreme Court, 
GALLUP (Apr. 1, 2018), http://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx. Support for the 
Court can vary with current events. For example, support among Republicans for the Court 
increased after the confirmation of Neil Gorsuch while it dropped among Democrats. Jeffrey M. 
Jones, Trust in Judicial Branch Up, Executive Branch Down, GALLUP (Sept. 20, 2017), 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/219674/trust-judicial-branch-executive-branch-down.aspx. 
 48.  Frank Newport, Half in U.S. Continue to Say Government Is an Immediate Threat, 
GALLUP (Sept. 21, 2015), http://news.gallup.com/poll/185720/half-continue-say-gov-immediate-
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live with paradox: “Americans have lost faith in their government, yet 
they revere the constitution that established their government and 
continues to structure its operations.”49 All the while, public 
knowledge about the Constitution is low. 
The proposed amendment represents a healthy intervention. It 
forces a focus on the relationships (for surely there are some) 
between the Constitution itself and the operations—and 
deficiencies—of contemporary government. It opens the door to 
examination of, conversation about, and perhaps rejection of specific 
features of the Constitution that, upon deliberation and debate, do 
not serve us well. The proposed amendment does not disparage 
current popular support for the Constitution, but rather provides 
mechanisms for ensuring that such support is based upon informed 
knowledge about the document and its effects and is developed in a 
context in which there exists the opportunity for reform. In essence, 
the proposed amendment provides for a more authentic commitment 
to our constitutional democracy than is possible when, as now, Article 
V precludes reform.50 
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALOGS AND LESSONS 
While the proposal would alter the mechanisms of Article V, it is 
not without precedent. It comports, at least in a broad sense, with 
constitutional amendment procedures that have long been available 
 
threat.aspx. 
 49.  SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 1 (2014). 
 50.  Here, the work of Professor Barber is especially relevant. He explains that 
“[v]enerating the Constitution is a bad idea because it obscures . . . constitutional failure and the 
corresponding need to promote reformist institutions.” Id. at 18. On the other hand, he says, it 
makes considerable sense to “commemorate” and even “venerate” the Founding because to do 
so is to “revisit a perspective in which the Constitution is both a mere proposal and a mere set of 
means” to put in place institutions that will achieve desirable political goals. Id. at 18–19. In 
other words, it is better to focus on the “founding act,” id. at 18, of seeking to create a system of 
government that will serve ends such as those referenced in the preamble, rather than consider 
the specific provisions of the document itself immutable to reform when the goals are no longer 
served. Indeed, resistance to changing the Constitution appears inconsistent with the document 
itself: “Fidelity to the Constitution as written would entail reaffirming the Constitution’s claim 
to be an instrument of its ends, and one could not reaffirm that claim without subjecting it to a 
critical examination that constitution worship precludes.” Id. at 118. As Professor Barber 
explains: 
Swearing to preserve and defend the Constitution is not promising to leave it as is, for 
the Constitution itself provides for change in Article V. . . . The amendability of this 
constitution and therewith the opportunity and the right to redo our founding is thus 
made part of what we take an oath to preserve and defend. Our constitution is thus 
officially ‘open to thought’—that is, open to reasoned criticism and change. 
Id. at 21. 
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at the state level. Consideration of those procedures sheds some light 
on the benefits and feasibility of the proposal—as well as some 
potential hazards. 
A. State Amendment Mechanisms 
States provide more mechanisms for altering their constitutions 
than are available under Article V to amend the federal 
Constitution.51 Indeed, a feature of state constitutional history is that 
over time amendment processes have been liberalized.52 One route at 
the state level is to hold a constitutional convention. Most state 
constitutions thus empower the state legislature to propose a 
convention (in some instances, a super-majority vote is required) and, 
if voters approve the proposal by referendum, the convention is 
held.53 In addition, every state constitution except that of Delaware 
provides for the state legislature itself to propose amendments for 
voter consideration in a state referendum.54 Two states, Florida and 
New Mexico, provide for a commission that operates separately from 
the legislature to propose amendments.55 Eighteen states provide for 
amendments to be proposed and adopted through voter initiatives, 
without the need for any legislative approval.56 In most states, the 
ratification of a proposed amendment requires a simple majority of 
voters approving the proposal by referendum.57 
Some state constitutions also periodically require asking voters 
whether they favor a convention for the purpose of proposing 
 
 51.  At the state constitutional level, it is customary to distinguish between amendment, the 
“addition or subtraction of material,” and revision, the “replacement of one constitution by 
another.” See Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 177, 178 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. 
Williams eds., 2006). While there is some variation among states, revising a constitution 
typically requires a constitutional convention. See id. 
 52.  See G. Alan Tarr, Popular Constitutionalism in State and Nation, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 
271–72 (2016) (“During the twentieth century, states multiplied modes of proposal and eased 
requirements for proposal and ratification, thereby facilitating constitutional amendment.”). 
 53.  See Benjamin, supra note 51, at 192. 
 54.  See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 12–13 tbl. 1.2 (2017), 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/1.3.2017.pdf (listing the constitutional 
amendment procedure by the legislature of each state). Delaware’s Constitution can be 
amended by a two-thirds vote of two successive legislatures without voter ratification. DEL 
CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
 55.  See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 54, at 14 tbl. 1.3 (“Constitutional 
Amendment Procedure: By Initiative”); FL. CONST. art. XI, § 10; N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1. 
 56.  Tarr, supra note 52, at 271. 
 57.  Id. at 274. 
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amendments—the state analog to the reform offered in this Article.58 
Although Thomas Jefferson is often credited with the idea of 
periodically reforming constitutions,59 Massachusetts got there first. 
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution provided that, “In order the 
more effectually to adhere to the principles of the Constitution, and to 
correct those violations which by any means may be made therein, as 
well as to form such alterations as from experience shall be found 
necessary,” the voters would be asked “their sentiments on the 
necessity or expediency of revising the Constitution.”60 Approval by 
two-thirds of the voters was required to trigger the revision process.61 
Today, fourteen state constitutions contain provisions requiring 
that voters be asked at designated intervals whether to call a state 
constitutional convention.62 Eight states put the question to voters 
every twenty years, four states do so every ten years, in one state 
(Michigan) the period is sixteen years, and in another (Hawaii) it is 
every nine years.63 
Although once the source of regular state conventions, over time, 
use of automatic question provisions to actually call a convention has 
declined: from one hundred and forty-four state conventions during 
the nineteenth century to sixty-four during the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries.64 Since 1970, there have been only four conventions 
pursuant to an automatic vote,65 with conventions held in New 
Hampshire in 1974 and 1984, in Hawaii in 1978, and in Rhode Island 
 
 58.  COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 54, at 15 tbl. 1.4. 
 59.  In a letter to Samuel Kercheval on reforming the Virginia Constitution, Jefferson 
wrote “let us provide in our constitution for its revision at stated periods” so that “[e]ach 
generation” can “choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own 
happiness . . . .” Observing that “[b]y the European tables of mortality, of the adults living at 
any one moment of time, a majority will be dead in about nineteen years,” Jefferson 
recommended that there be “a solemn opportunity” to revise a constitution “every nineteen or 
twenty years, . . . so that it may be handed on, with periodical repairs, from generation to 
generation.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 12 THE 
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, CORRESPONDENCE AND PAPERS 1816-1826, at 12–13 (Paul 
Leicester Ford ed., Federal ed. 1905). 
 60.  MASS. CONST. ch. 6, art. X (1780). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 3; CONN. CONST. art. XIII, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4; 
HAW. CONST. art. XVII, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; MICH. 
CONST. art. XII, § 3; MO. CONST. art. XII, § 3(a); MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 
2, art. 100(c); N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV, 
§ 2; R.I. CONST. art. XIV, § 2. 
 63.  See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 54, at 15 tbl. 1.4. 
 64.  Tarr, supra note 52, at 267. 
 65.  Id. 
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in 1986.66 No state convention—whether by mandatory vote or 
legislative proposal—has been held since 1992, the year a state 
constitutional convention took place in Louisiana by proposal of that 
state’s legislature.67 In every mandatory periodic referendum so far 
this century, voters have rejected holding a constitutional convention, 
though in some instances by only small margins: in 2000 in Iowa 
(66.7% opposed);68 in 2002 in Alaska (71.6%),69 Missouri (65.5%),70 
and New Hampshire (50.9%);71 in 2004 in Rhode Island (52%);72 in 
2008 in Connecticut (59.4%),73 Hawaii (61.9%)74 and Illinois 
(67.3%);75 in 2010 in Iowa (67%), Maryland (48.5%), Michigan (67%), 
and Montana (58%);76 in 2012 in Alaska (67%), New Hampshire 
(64%), and Ohio (68%);77 in 2014 in Rhode Island (55%);78 and in 
2017 in New York (77.7%).79 
State constitutional conventions that have resulted from voter 
approval of a mandatory ballot question have not, of course, 
consistently resulted in any constitutional amendments: the 
 
 66.  John Dinan, The Political Dynamics of Mandatory State Constitutional Convention 
Referendums: Lessons from the 2000s Regarding Obstacles and Pathways to their Passage, 71 
MONT. L. REV. 395, 396–97, tbl. 1 (2010). 
 67.  Id. at 396. American Samoa held a convention in 2010. The resulting proposed 
amendments, which included greater autonomy for the territory, were later rejected by voters 
by a wide margin. Associated Press, Faleomavaega Wins 12th Election to Congress, KPUA 
(Nov. 4, 2010), https://perma.cc/QHV2-QUBX; Sarah Wheaton, An American Concept, Carried 
Out in Samoan Style, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/06/25/us/25samoa.html.  
 68.  Dinan, supra note 66, at 405. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 406. 
 71.  Id. at 408. 
 72.  Id. at 410. 
 73.  Id. at 412. 
 74.  Id. at 415. 
 75.  Id. at 417. 
 76.  John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2010, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 
3, 4–5 (2011). 
 77.  John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2012, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 
3, 4 (2013). 
 78.  John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2014, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 
3, 4 (2015). 
 79.  See N.Y. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Proposal Election Returns Nov. 7, 2017, 
https://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/elections/2017/general/2017GeneralElectionProp1.pdf. 
An additional 6.1% of voters left the question blank and those votes also count as no votes. See 
id. Note that in Oklahoma, section 2 of Article XXIV of the state Constitution requires asking 
voters every 20 years whether they approve calling a constitutional convention, but the most 
recent year in which voters were asked was 1970. Since then the legislature has refused to put 
the question on the ballot and bills requiring implementation of section 2 have failed. See 
Dinan, supra note 66, at 401. Although in 1994 the legislature put to voters in a referendum a 
proposal to abolish section 2, that proposal was defeated. Id. 
MAZZONE 5.18.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2018  3:46 PM 
132 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:2 
convention itself still needs to approve an amendment and then the 
amendment must be ratified. Nonetheless, some such conventions 
have played important roles in shaping the content of modern state 
constitutions. The 1986 convention that occurred in Rhode Island 
(following voter approval in 1984) generated fourteen proposed 
amendments that were submitted to the voters in that year’s general 
election.80 Eight of the fourteen proposals were ratified.81 These 
included a requirement to adopt a re-written constitution to account 
for all amendments since 1843, new ethics rules for government, and a 
set of constitutional rights.82 The state constitution that Rhode 
Islanders have today is very much a product of the 1986 convention. 
B. Lessons from the States 
Two lessons seem evident. One is that there already exists a 
tradition of periodically asking Americans whether they favor a 
constitutional convention—or at least a tradition of asking some 
Americans that question some of the time. A second lesson is that the 
opportunity is not always, indeed is only infrequently, seized. The 
pattern suggests that if voters are periodically asked if they favor a 
convention to amend the federal Constitution, the answer will 
sometimes, and perhaps often, be no. Depending on one’s perspective 
that news will appear good or bad. Perhaps the implication is that 
because voters will only favor a convention in the most serious of 
circumstances, the proposed change to Article V is an appropriate 
mechanism. Alternatively, the implication might be that because 
voters won’t make use of the mechanism, there is no point making it 
available. It is therefore helpful to consider some additional evidence 
about what is happening at the state level. 
One obvious explanation for declining support for state 
constitutional conventions is that state citizens are (by now) satisfied 
with their constitutions and naturally there is not the same need to 
make repairs as there once was. Commentators tend not to put much 
stock in that explanation, however, and have offered different views 
on why voters today are less inclined to favor a state constitutional 
convention than they were in the past. 
 
 80.  Albert L. Sturm & Janice C. May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision: 
1986-87, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2, 3 (1988). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
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Gerald Benjamin and Thomas Gais posit that automatic 
convention mechanisms at the state level suffer from 
“conventionphobia.”83 They suggest that increasingly the public views 
state conventions as controlled by political insiders seeking to 
enhance their own power—rather than an opportunity for the people 
to adopt favorable reforms.84 Under these circumstances, voters are 
disinclined to approve a convention. 
A different explanation for the decline in state constitutional 
conventions is that state constitutions can be amended far more easily 
than can the federal Constitution, and without the need to hold a 
convention at all. Indeed, even though the number of state 
constitutional conventions has dropped, the rate at which state 
constitutions are amended has increased over time.85 State 
constitutions have been amended more than 6,500 times, representing 
an average of 1.25 amendments per state per year.86 During the period 
2006 to 2017, 815 state constitutional amendments were proposed to 
voters and 584 proposed changes were adopted.87 In 2017, voters 
ratified all 17 amendments proposed at the state level.88 These 
numbers help make sense of the decline in voter approval of 
conventions: if easier procedures for amending particular provisions 
of a constitution are available, there is less of a need to call a 
convention. Perhaps, then, the lesson for the proposed change to 
Article V is that because the existing mechanisms to amend the 
federal Constitution are so difficult to deploy, voters will be more 
inclined to favor a federal convention than they currently favor 
conventions to amend state constitutions. 
At the same time, the decline of state-level conventions remains 
significant. Professor Tarr deems the development “the 
professionalization of state constitutional change.” He explains: 
In the nineteenth century, conventions served as a mechanism for 
popular influence on politics, often called by reluctant officials in 
response to popular pressures. But in the twentieth century far 
 
 83.  See Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA 
L. & POL’Y SYMP. 53, 69 (1996). 
 84.  Id. at 71. 
 85.  See Tarr, supra note 52, at 267–68. 
 86.  Id. at 256. 
 87.  Constitutional Amendments from 2006 through 2017, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Constitutional_amendments_from_2006_through_2017 (last visited Mar. 
15, 2018). 
 88.  Id. 
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fewer conventions have been called, and their character has 
changed. Typically, it has been political elites and professional 
reformers who have campaigned for constitutional revision, with 
the populace reduced to rejecting convention calls and proposed 
constitutions to register its distrust of a process that it no longer 
feels it controls.89 
In this regard, the ability to amend a state constitution through 
legislative proposal and voter ratification, now the most common 
route, does not fully serve as a substitute for a convention. When 
amendments begin with the legislature, the process is easily 
dominated by political insiders rather than serving as an outlet for 
populist energies. The possibility of voter-initiated amendments is also 
an imperfect substitute for a convention: legislative proposals are 
ratified at higher rates than those that result from voter initiative. 
Proposals from conventions, however, are ratified at the highest rate 
of all.90 The convention setting provides both a mechanism for 
generating different amendments than those that emerge from 
legislative processes and for proposing changes to a constitution that 
may receive very high levels of public support at the ratification stage. 
Based on his analysis of recent mandatory convention 
referendums, Professor Dinan points to two reasons voters tend to 
reject calling a state constitutional convention: (i) indifference on the 
part of citizens to state constitutional reform that results from a low 
level of citizen knowledge about state constitutions91 (only a bare 
majority of citizens may even know their state has a constitution)92; 
and (ii) opposition to a convention from the dominant legislative 
party and from many interest groups.93 Professor Dinan also identifies 
corresponding factors that make it more likely voters will favor a 
convention when asked. In addition to more active campaigning by 
convention proponents, he finds that preparatory commissions can 
increase citizen knowledge and overcome citizen indifference, and 
that governors and gubernatorial candidates can play a strong role in 
bringing attention to the need for constitutional reform.94 Professor 
Dinan reports further that efforts to overcome powerful opposition 
 
 89.  G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 170 (1998). 
 90.  Tarr, supra note 52, at 272. 
 91.  Dinan, supra note 66, at 418–19. 
 92.  TARR, supra note 89, at 2 n.4 (reporting 52% of respondents knew that their state had 
its own constitution). 
 93.  Dinan, supra note 66, at 420–21. 
 94.  Id. at 425–27. 
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interests succeed when such efforts focus on “identify[ing] 
institutional reforms or issues that command particular support but 
are blocked in the political process or do not stand a chance of 
emerging from the constitutional amendment process.”95 In particular, 
he finds that when convention supporters highlight the possibility of 
adopting, through a convention, enhanced mechanisms for direct 
democracy (such as initiatives, recalls, and legislative term-limits) and 
amendments to overturn unpopular state supreme court rulings, 
voters are more likely to favor a convention.96 
The result of the most recent mandatory vote on whether to hold 
a state convention, in New York in 2017, sheds some additional light. 
Despite widely-held views that their state government is in need of 
reform,97 New Yorkers rejected holding a constitutional convention by 
a wide margin. A common concern was the fear of a runaway 
convention. Opposition to a constitutional convention on this ground 
unified the Right to Life Committee, the New York State Rifle and 
Pistol Association, and conservative political organizations with 
Planned Parenthood, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and labor 
unions.98 Although these organizations had different particularized 
concerns, they shared the belief that a convention was dangerous 
because, once started, there was no telling what changes the 
convention would seek to make to the state constitution. In particular, 
opponents warned that a convention could easily seek to do away 
with constitutional rights.99 None of the convention proponents had 
 
 95.  Id. at 428. 
 96.  Id. at 428–31. 
 97.  See NEW YORK’S BROKEN CONSTITUTION: THE GOVERNANCE CRISIS AND THE PATH 
TO RENEWED GREATNESS (Peter J. Galie et al. eds., 2016). One newspaper editorial board 
urged voters to approve a convention because “[t]he state’s government is a scandalous 
embarrassment. It is tilted to keep incumbents in power, to please special interests and to thwart 
reform. It is a system that, even on its good days, is maddeningly dysfunctional.” Fix This 
Government and Vote This Fall for a Constitutional Convention, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 22, 
2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/fix-government-vote-constitutional-convention-
article-1.3180479. 
 98.  See, e.g., Broad Coalition Forms to Fight Con Con, SPECTRUM NEWS—STATE OF 
POLITICS, June 19, 2017, http://www.nystateofpolitics.com/2017/06/broad-coalition-forms-to-
fight-con-con.  
 99.  See, e.g., Josefa Velasquez, State Supreme Court Justices Oppose Constitutional 
Convention, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19, 2017, https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/ 
1202800857281/ (reporting on statement by Justice Deborah Dowling that “[a]fter thoroughly 
reviewing the issue, the Association of Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New York 
has determined that a state constitutional convention is unnecessary, would be overly costly, 
and could result in the reversion, elimination or diminution of many current constitutional rights 
and safeguards”); Ned Hoskin, Why We Must Say NO to a State Constitutional Convention, N.Y. 
ST. UNITED TCHRS., Jan. 26, 2016, https://www.nysut.org/news/nysut-
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ever suggested the convention should seek to cut back on the liberties 
New Yorkers enjoy under their state constitution, but the fear that 
rights were at risk proved impossible to overcome. 
Some of these same issues might emerge in a debate over whether 
to hold a convention to propose amendments to the federal 
Constitution. However, the political dynamics at the national level 
would probably differ. While there might well be opposition to a 
convention from powerful insiders and concerns that a convention 
could do away with favored constitutional protections, it is also likely 
that there would be countervailing forces: individuals and 
organizations capable of explaining why a constitutional convention is 
warranted and how there are checks on a truly runaway process. In 
particular, requiring that any proposed amendment be approved by a 
majority of the states with two-thirds of the Representatives (rather 
than a simple majority of voters) serves as a significant tempering 
element. 
III. SOME ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
Four additional issues pertaining to this Article’s proposed 
amendment to Article V merit further discussion. These are (A) some 
implications of the contemplated timing for asking voters whether 
they favor a Convention, (B) whether the new amendment route is 
likely to produce serious efforts at constitutional reform, (C) whether 
there is a risk of a runaway process that produces too many or unwise 
changes, and (D) some of the practical aspects of the amendment 
process that is envisaged. 
 
united/issues/2016/february-2016/why-we-must-say-no-to-a-state-constitutional-convention 
(“Many of the rights we enjoy as New York state citizens would be fair game should a State 
Constitutional Convention take place.”); New York State Constitutional Convention, N.Y. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/issues/voting-rights/new-york-state-constitutional-
convention (“The NYCLU firmly opposes the constitutional convention. It would place in 
serious danger our state protections for civil rights and civil liberties. That’s because the process 
is rigged to favor the interests of the powerful.”); Why Voters Should Reject a Constitutional 
Convention, UNITED FED’N OF TEACHERS (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.uft.org/q-issues/why-
voters-should-reject-constitutional-convention (warning that “[a] constitutional convention is 
unlimited in the scope of what it could change. This would place New York State’s rights and 
protections at risk of alteration or elimination, including the guarantee of a free public 
education, a prohibition against aid to non-public schools and the right to Workers’ 
Compensation. The right to unionize and bargain collectively and state requirements regarding 
pensions and social welfare could also wind up on the chopping block”). 
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A. Timing 
A potential problem with any mandatory referendum on whether 
to hold a constitutional convention is that the time at which the vote 
occurs might not neatly correspond with a well-reasoned sense on the 
part of voters that constitutional reform is needed. On the one hand, 
problems that a convention could resolve might emerge years before 
a vote on holding a convention is scheduled. Thus we face the 
prospect of having to put up with some defect in our governing 
arrangements until a convention question year rolls around. On the 
other hand, some problems might arise immediately prior to the vote 
but without adequate time for voters to consider fully whether the 
problem is so serious that a convention should be called. In that 
scenario, “yes” votes might represent heat-of-the-moment decisions 
or a precautionary gamble given that the next opportunity to approve 
a convention will be twenty years away. 
Issues of timing thus risk distorting convention referenda. 
Imagine, for instance, that on the day of a vote on whether to hold a 
convention the sitting President has become increasingly erratic and 
over the course of the preceding two months has vowed to launch 
nuclear attacks on a dozen countries he deems enemies of the United 
States and that neither Congress nor the courts appear willing or able 
to check the President’s actions. While it is probably unlikely the next 
President will engage in similar behavior—so that, as an institutional 
matter, amending the Constitution would be a heavy-handed 
response—and while there is little guarantee that a convention could 
act quickly enough to limit the current President’s powers, voters, 
anxious for some sort of response, might favor a convention. 
A further issue of timing is that in the years in which a convention 
vote is scheduled, there might be undue attention paid to issues that 
in other years would not generate much passion. In other words, the 
availability of a convention might make relatively mundane issues 
appear to be problems of a constitutional dimension ripe for a 
convention-sponsored solution. For example, in off-cycle years, 
controversial Supreme Court decisions might be criticized and 
debated but nonetheless gain public acceptance. In years in which a 
convention vote is held, however, the same decisions might become 
targets for correction through the amendment process. 
Furthermore, institutional actors might engage in strategic 
behavior to avoid the check of a constitutional convention. For 
example, Congress might delay enacting controversial legislation until 
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after a convention vote. The Supreme Court might put off a big ruling 
until the referendum is over. Presidents who are in office in periods 
leading up to a convention might act more modestly than presidents 
who know they have four or eight years that are referendum free. 
It is not obvious that all of these risks demand responses beyond 
those the normal political process will make available. One key 
feature, though, to the proposed amendment bears emphasis: section 6 
guards against hastily-adopted amendments by imposing a time lag 
between proposal and ratification. Section 6 sets a two-year delay 
between the national convention responsible for proposing 
amendments and the state conventions responsible for deciding 
whether to adopt the proposals. Putting off ratification for a time 
allows for further debate about proposed amendments, lets some 
problems resolve themselves through other means, and focuses 
amendment processes on issues of lingering institutional concern. 
There is, of course, room for debate about the appropriate period of 
delay. In some minds, two years might be too long: the period might 
mean energy for constitutional reform always dissipates before 
anything gets done and might prevent a needed quick response to a 
very serious problem. For others, two years might be two short. 
Perhaps a four-year lag makes more sense because within that period 
of time elections (and other processes) might well resolve problems 
without the need for a constitutional amendment.100 
B. Possibilities of Reform 
Given the high degree of popular support for the Constitution (as 
described in Part I), it is fair to ask whether the proposal would ever 
result in a convention being called, the convention agreeing to 
 
 100.  A different risk bears flagging. With periodic voting on whether to hold a 
constitutional convention, members of the government might form the view that a ‘no’ vote 
signals that the citizenry is satisfied, even happy, with the way in which the government is 
operating.  Thus, the failure of the people to convene and adopt amendments to alter what the 
government is doing—to require a balanced budget, impose term limits upon members of 
Congress, protect new rights, overturn a Supreme Court decision—could be taken to mean that 
no reform is desired or needed. Accordingly, government, emboldened, might continue on its 
same course or perhaps act more boldly. Given that voters might be both dissatisfied with what 
the government is doing and reluctant (for other reasons) to proceed to a convention to adopt 
amendments, there is a risk of the availability of the convention process proposed in this article 
increasing the gap between what government does and what citizens want.  In other words, right 
now, we can comfortably say, “We don’t like the way things are going but it is too hard to 
amend the Constitution to fix the problems.” If amendment is a realistic option and yet not 
exercised, fault for political deficiencies shifts squarely to the public and inaction on its part 
might easily be taken as acquiescence. 
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amendments, and those amendments being ratified. Why, after all, 
would Americans proceed to a constitutional convention if they think 
so highly of their Constitution? Perhaps, then, the only benefit to the 
proposal is offering a means of constitutional change that in reality is 
never used. 
It is hard to know in advance whether and how the proposed 
mechanism for amendments would be deployed. Nonetheless, it is 
important to recognize that while in surveys Americans express high 
regard for the Constitution and a general resistance to changing it, 
there is also support for specific amendments. In other words, 
Americans do support particular reforms even while, in the abstract, 
they say they do not favor altering the Constitution. 
For example, surveys show majority support for congressional 
term limits and mandatory congressional retirement ages.101 
Americans also support abolishing the Electoral College so as to 
provide for popular election of the President102 (although such 
support tends to be sensitive to electoral outcomes).103 Some surveys 
show support for term limits and a retirement age at the Supreme 
Court and even for the election, rather than appointment, of the 
 
 101.  See Arthur H. Taylor, Fear of an Article V Convention, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 407, 430–36 
(2006) (citing Nat’l Survey on Constitutional Change, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (2005)) (reporting 
71% of respondents in favor of congressional term limits); Lydia Saad, Americans Call for Term 
Limits, End to Electoral College, GALLUP (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/159881/americans-call-term-limits-end-electoral-college.aspx? 
version=print (reporting that 75% of Americans would vote for congressional term limits); 
Aspen Ideas Festival, supra note 34 (reporting support for a mandatory retirement age for 
members of Congress (66% of respondents)). 
 102.  See Saad, supra note 101 (reporting that 63% of Americans would vote for doing away 
with the electoral college); Aspen Ideas Festival, supra note 34 (reporting 74% of respondents 
favor abolishing the electoral college). 
 103.  Since 1967 majorities have supported an amendment abolishing the electoral college 
and providing for popular election of the President; support has been as high as 80% (in 1968). 
See The Public and Proposed Constitutional Amendments: We Love You, You’re Perfect, Now 
Change, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OP. RESEARCH (last visited May 18, 2018), 
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/the-public-and-proposed-constitutional-amendments-we-love-
you-youre-perfect-now-change-2/. Yet support has also varied depending on electoral outcomes: 
after Al Gore won the popular vote but lost the electoral college in 2000 support for an 
amendment sharply rose among Democrats. See id. After Donald Trump won the electoral 
college but lost the popular vote in 2016, surveys showed that Republicans (70%) favored 
keeping the electoral college while Democrats (78%) favored amending the Constitution to 
provide for popular election of the President. See Sarah Dutton et al., Poll: More Americans 
Believe Popular Vote Should Decide the President, CBS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-more-americans-believe-popular-vote-should-decide-the-
president/; Art Swift, Americans’ Support for Electoral College Rises Sharply, GALLUP (Dec. 2, 
2016) (reporting that 47% of Americans favor keeping the electoral college as a result of 
increased support among Republicans). 
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Justices.104 Beyond the structures of government, a balanced budget 
amendment has long been popular with the public105 as has an 
amendment to permit school prayer.106 Recently, surveys have also 
shown that Americans favor, by large margins, modifying the 
birthright citizenship provision of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
response to so-called maternity tourism.107 
This sort of evidence does not necessarily indicate that the 
proposed convention process would result in amendments to the 
Constitution on these or any other issues. Nonetheless, the evidence 
does suggest that there is likely to be interest, at least in some 
circumstances, in making use of the new amendment procedure. 
C. A Runaway Convention? 
As described in Part II, opposition to state constitutional 
conventions has often focused on the risk of the runaway 
convention.108 The concern has two dimensions. The first is that if a 
convention is called for a specific purpose, i.e. to consider certain 
constitutional amendments, it might just ignore that purpose and 
 
 104.  Aspen Ideas Festival, supra note 34 (reporting majority support for a retirement age 
for members of the Supreme Court (69%), term limits for the justices (66%), and election 
rather than appointment of the justices (51%)). 
 105.  See Taylor, supra note 101, at 432 (reporting 76% of respondents in support of a 
balanced budget amendment); The Economist/YouGov Poll (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/2L3T-7FH8 (reporting 43% “strongly support” or “somewhat support” an 
amendment to the Constitution requiring a balanced budget); NBC News/Wall Street Journal 
Poll (April 7, 2011), https://perma.cc/D7ZH-ZD2V (61% favoring a balanced budget 
amendment). 
 106.  See Alison Gash & Angelo Gonzales, School Prayer, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 77 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (“[P]ublic opinion has 
remained [over four decades] solidly against the Court’s landmark decisions declaring school 
prayer unconstitutional. The public has been and continues to be highly supportive of a 
constitutional amendment overturning these decisions. . . . [P]ublic sentiment has changed only 
modestly over the years, even though the percentage of Americans who express no religious 
preference has notably increased.”); Taylor, supra note 101, at 433 (reporting 74% in support of 
an amendment “requir[ing] judges to interpret the laws and not write them” and 67% favoring 
an amendment permitting prayer at public school ceremonies). 
 107.  A 2011 poll asked: “Some pregnant foreigners arrange trips to the United States, 
specifically timed so that they give birth during their stay, making any child born an automatic 
U.S. citizen. Do you think the U.S. Constitution should be changed to no longer allow for this?” 
45% of respondents answered that the Constitution “definitely should” be changed; 22% 
answered it “probably should” be changed. Two-thirds of Americans Think Constitution Should 




 108.  See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
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propose other kinds of amendments beyond those contemplated at 
the time the convention call was approved. The second dimension is 
that a convention, once started, might rework large portions of the 
constitution, perhaps even undo the entire constitution, in ways that 
have unpredictable and potentially disastrous results. 
Concerns about runaway conventions are also a frequent basis for 
opposition to a state-initiated convention under the existing 
provisions of Article V.109 Notably there have been hundreds of state 
resolutions calling for a federal constitutional convention to consider 
specific amendments. In particular, in recent years twenty-seven states 
have sought a convention to propose a balanced-budget 
amendment.110 Opposition—including from both the John Birch 
Society111 and the ACLU112—has centered on the concern that, once 
called, the scope of any convention could not be limited and the entire 
Constitution would be up for reconsideration and change.113 
Convention proponents, by contrast, have argued that past experience 
at the state level shows that fears of a runaway convention are 
exaggerated and that conventions result generally in modest and 
predictable changes.114 
These debates have given rise to a number of issues concerning a 
convention called by the states. One is whether there exists any legal 
mechanism for constraining such a convention. If, in accordance with 
the existing provisions of Article V, two-thirds of the states petition 
for a convention to consider an amendment on a specific issue and 
 
 109.  See Arthur J. Goldberg, The Proposed Constitutional Convention, 11 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 1, 2 (1983). 
 110.  America Might See a New Constitutional Convention in a Few Years, ECONOMIST 
(Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21729735-if-it-did-would-be-
dangerous-thing-america-might-see-new-constitutional-convention. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See Jay Stanley, Calls For a Constitutional Convention Heating Up in the States, ACLU 
(Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/calls-constitutional-convention-heating-
states (“[T]here is no way to ensure that the convention would confine itself to whatever subject 
inspired its creation, without veering off into dangerously impetuous rewriting of our nation’s 
foundational legal document.”). 
 113.  See, e.g., David A Super, A Constitutional Convention is the Last Thing America Needs, 
L.A. TIMES (May 15, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-super-constitutional-
convention-20170315-story.html (“No one—not Congress, not the Supreme Court and certainly 
not the president—has any authority to rein in a runaway constitutional convention. Given 
today’s politics, who could be sure that nothing crazy would be successfully proposed, and quite 
possibly ratified?”). 
 114.  See, e.g., Nick Dranias, 10 Facts to Rebut the Mythology of a Runaway Convention, 
GOLDWATER INST., https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/cms_page_media/ 
2015/6/3/10%20Facts%20Runaway%20Conv.pdf. 
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Congress, in response, calls the convention for that purpose, is the 
convention limited to what the states sought and Congress gave? 
Scholars have offered different views on whether the scope of a 
convention can be limited and whether such limits can be enforced, 
including whether states even have power to seek a convention for a 
limited purpose.115 A related issue is whether Congress can impose a 
check at the back end by deciding which, if any, convention-generated 
proposals to submit to the states for ratification. Some scholars (and 
an occasional Senator) have suggested that the check on a runaway 
convention is that Congress can refuse to send proposals to the states 
for ratification.116 Other scholars contend that Congress lacks such a 
power.117 Whatever the merits of the different positions on these 
 
 115.  For a sampling of views, see Charles L. Black, Jr., Amendment by National 
Constitutional Convention: A Letter to a Senator, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 626, 630 (1979) (arguing that 
a convention necessarily has the same unlimited authority as does Congress to propose 
amendments); Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the “Limited” Constitutional 
Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1624 (1979); Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of 
Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1, 6–11 (1979); Robert G. Natelson, 
Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. 
REV. 693, 715 (2011) (“Perhaps no Article V question has been debated so fiercely, on so little 
evidence, as whether applying states may limit the scope of a convention for proposing 
amendments. A more complete view of the evidence tells us the answer is almost certainly 
‘yes.’”); id. at 736 (“Because of its agency role, Congress may—in fact, must—limit the subject 
matter of the convention to the extent specified by the applying states.”); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, How to Count to Thirty-Four: The Constitutional Case for a Constitutional Convention, 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 848 (2011) (“[T]here cannot constitutionally be such a thing as 
a limited Article V convention. . . .”); Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of a Limited 
Convention: An Originalist Analysis, 81 CONST. COMMENTARY 53, 56 (2012) (“[O]nce two 
thirds of the states apply for the same limited convention, Congress is obligated to call that 
limited convention. Moreover, the convention is required to conform to the limits in Congress’s 
call. If the convention were to violate the limitations in the call— if it were to propose an 
amendment that was not within the scope of its authority—then that proposal would be 
unconstitutional . . . and could not be legally ratified by the states.”); William W. Van Alstyne, 
The Limited Constitutional Convention—The Recurring Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985, 990–91 
(1979); Bruce Ackerman, Unconstitutional Convention, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 1979, at 8. 
 116.  See, e.g., Sam J. Ervin, Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of 
Amending the Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 875, 879 (1968); Paul G. Kauper, The Alternative 
Amendment Process: Some Observations, 66 MICH. L. REV. 903, 907 (1968); Michael Stern, 
Reopening the Constitutional Road to Reform: Toward a Safeguarded Article V Convention, 78 
TENN. L. REV. 765 (Spring 2011); Interview by Shane Lehman with Sen. Tom Coburn (Jun. 28, 
2017), https://americanpastorsnetwork.net /2017/06/28/6-20-17-runaway-convention/ (“The other 
safety valve on this, is let’s say they pass something like that, the Congress would never send it 
to the states because it violates the constitution because they’re making amendments outside of 
the application that they’ve made. So first of all, if they pass something like that it will never get 
to the states.”). 
 117.  Paulsen, supra note 115, at 842 (“[W]here Article V contemplates “checks” on the 
work of an amendment-proposing convention, it says so explicitly: Congress, not the 
convention, is given the power to prescribe the mode of ratification (state legislatures or state 
ratifying conventions) and three-fourths of the states must ratify for an amendment to become 
valid as part of the Constitution.”). 
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issues, it is not obvious that a court would intervene to resolve a 
dispute between Congress and a convention held upon application by 
the states. In the past courts have ducked challenges to amendments 
as political questions (or on other grounds),118 and are probably very 
unlikely to get involved in future such challenges. 
A further comparison between amending state constitutions and 
amending the federal constitution bears flagging: a state amendment 
process can never be fully runaway because the U.S. Constitution 
serves as a backstop to state-level change. This is true in two senses. 
First, amending a state constitution to reduce or eliminate protected 
rights would have no effect upon rights that are part of the federal 
Constitution. Second, there are federal constitutional limits to changes 
that can be made at the state level. For instance, states could not 
amend their constitutions to protect life at conception, or criminalize 
interracial marriage, or prohibit criticism of the government because 
all of these things would violate the federal Constitution. There is, 
however, no comparable backstop to the federal Constitution unless 
one accepts that some portions of it cannot be altered through the 
amendment process or that there are otherwise built-in-limits on the 
kinds of changes amendment procedures allow.119 
The proposed amendment contains provisions that guard against a 
runaway process and the political disputes such a process might 
generate. First, under section 1, a convention cannot meet unless 
approved by a majority of voters in a majority of states. Second, under 
section 4, proposed amendments must be approved by two-thirds of 
the delegates before they can be submitted to the states for 
ratification. Third, under section 6, a majority of the state conventions 
must approve any proposed amendment and (as a proxy for 
population) those states must together have two-thirds of the voting 
Representatives in the House. 
 
 118.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939) (holding that the question 
whether Kansas had properly ratified the proposed Child Labor Amendment was for Congress, 
not the Court, to determine); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (rejecting challenge to 
the Nineteenth Amendment that “so great an addition to the electorate . . . destroys . . . [the] 
autonomy [of a state] as a political body”); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921) (rejecting 
an argument in a prisoner’s habeas corpus petition that the Eighteenth Amendment was 
unconstitutional because Congress, in imposing a seven-year time limit for the states to ratify 
the Amendment, had burdened the deliberative processes of the states); National Prohibition 
Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (rejecting several challenges to the Eighteenth Amendment). 
 119.  For an argument along these lines, see Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 1747 (2005). 
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The ratification bar of section 6 is particularly significant for 
ensuring broad support for any amendment. Given the current 
number of states and Representatives, ratification would require the 
vote of 26 states with 290 Representatives. While there are various 
combinations of states that can reach that threshold, proposed 
amendments will fail without national support. In particular, if the 
four largest states decide against ratifying a proposed amendment, it 
is almost certainly doomed: California (53 U.S. Representatives), 
Texas (36), Florida (27), and New York (27) together have 143 
Representatives. If they all vote against a proposed amendment, 
ratification will require approval in nearly every other state. Defeat in 
the next largest state, Pennsylvania (18 Representatives), would mean 
the amendment will fail, as would defeat in New Mexico, Nebraska or 
West Virginia (3 Representatives each). 
These mechanisms provide significant safeguards against adoption 
of poorly thought out, minimally discussed, or hastily made 
constitutional changes. Significant reform is possible—that is the 
whole point—but only reforms that generate broad support over a 
sustained period of time will succeed. Thus, for example, some judicial 
decisions are initially very unpopular and provoke calls for a 
constitutional amendment but with time generate less opposition. This 
has been true with respect to same-sex marriage120 and flag burning.121 
Such decisions are not likely to be targets for amendment. 
 
 120.  When Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage, see 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 789 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2014), a clear majority of Americans 
supported amending the federal Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage throughout the 
country. See Nat’l Survey, supra note 101 (reporting that 64% of Americans supported 
amending the Constitution to define marriage in all states as the union of a man and a woman). 
By the time the Supreme Court invalidated the provision of the Defense of Marriage Act 
defining marriage for federal purposes as between a man and a woman, see United States v. 
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), there was no majority in favor of such an amendment. See Dana 
Blanton, Fox News Poll: 49 Percent Favor Gay Marriage, Up From 32 Percent in 2003, FOX 
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2013) (reporting that in response to the question, “Would you favor or oppose 
amending the U.S. Constitution to define marriage as being between a man and a woman?,” 
41% of respondents answered they “strongly oppose[d]” the measure and 9% said they 
“somewhat oppose[d]” it; 32% answered they “strongly favor[ed]” the measure and 9% said 
they “somewhat favor[ed]” it); Quinnipiac Univ. Poll (July 12, 2013) 
https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/us/us07122013.pdf/ (reporting that in response to the question, 
“Do you think each state should make its own law on whether same-sex marriage is legal or 
illegal there, or do you think this should be decided for all states on the basis of the U.S. 
Constitution?,” 40% of respondents answered “state laws” while 53% answered the 
Constitution). 
 121.  After the Supreme Court held in 1989 that the First Amendment protects the right to 
burn the flag, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), 71% of respondents supported 
amending the Constitution in response to the decision. By 2006, the figure had dropped to 56% 
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D. Practicalities 
While Article V provides for a convention on the application of 
two-thirds of the state legislatures, it does not provide any details 
about how such a convention is to operate. This leaves open some 
significant questions—and (because uncertainty can be a source of 
anxiety) likely helps explain why no Article V convention has ever 
been held. Among the most obvious issues are: how delegates are to 
be selected, their numbers and qualifications; whether states have 
equal voting rights (or even whether voting is by state); and whether 
at the convention proposed amendments must be approved by a 
simple majority (of states?) or some other formula. Article V also 
does not tell us who decides these and related issues. Given the lack 
of specificity in Article V itself, commentators have offered different 
views on which kinds of processes and arrangements are desirable or 
constitutionally required.122 
At the state level, “[s]tate constitutions vary enormously in the 
degree of detail with which they deal with the specifics of staffing, 
convening, structuring, and operating a constitutional convention once 
it is called.”123 In general, in states where the legislature has the power 
to decide whether to ask voters if they favor a convention, there tend 
to be few constitutionally-specified requirements about how the 
convention will operate.124  The inference is that the legislature also 
gets to make such determinations through enabling statutes.125 By 
 
and it continues to decline. See ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OP. RESEARCH, supra note 103; see also 
Peter Hanson, Flag Burning, in Persily, supra note 106, at 199 (“[P]ublic opposition to flag 
burning has not changed. But support for an amendment to overturn the decision has waned, 
and the public no longer views flag burning as a high-priority issue.”). 
 122.  See, e.g., RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE 
CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 119 (1988) (arguing that individual states have 
authority to decide how delegates are to be selected and that the convention itself determines 
voting procedures and rules); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A 
Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957, 964–65 (1963) (arguing that Congress has power to 
determine the method of selecting delegates and the voting rules at a convention and that there 
is no constitutional requirement that voting occur on a state-by-state basis such that each state 
be given a single vote to be shared among delegates); Natelson, supra note 115, at 697–98, 740–
41 (arguing that the practices of inter-colonial and interstate conventions during the 1770s and 
1780s along with post-Founding practices provide the rules for conventions under Article V so 
that “the Article V convention is a creature . . . of the state legislatures, not of Congress, nor of 
the people directly” and “[t]hose legislatures, therefore, determine how delegates are allocated 
and selected[;]” and the convention itself determines voting rules and other aspects of its 
procedures). 
 123.  Benjamin, supra note 51, at 194. 
 124.  Id. at 194–95. 
 125.  Id. 
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contrast, in states where the voters are able to bypass the legislature 
and themselves call for a convention, the state constitution is typically 
much more specific about how the convention will be structured.126 
The New York Constitution, for example, which provides for a 
referendum every 20 years on whether to hold a convention, contains 
a long list of procedural requirements any such convention must 
follow.127 Within these general parameters, state constitutions contain 
various provisions specifying such things as the size of the convention 
and the selection of delegates, the time and place of a convention, and 
how the convention is to be funded.128 
The organization and operation of a federal constitutional 
convention matters a good deal. For example, a convention in which 
each state is represented by its sitting U.S. Senators would be very 
different from one in which delegates are elected in a state special 
election. Evaluating whether the proposed change to Article V 
offered in this Article makes sense requires knowing something about 
how any resulting convention will operate and how amendments the 
convention generates will be ratified. The proposal offered here thus 
sets out key aspects of the convention, including (in section 1) the 
number of delegates and how they are to be selected, the timing and 
location of the convention (section 1), how salaries and expenses are 
to be paid (section 3), certain voting rules (sections 4 and 5), and the 
form that proposed amendments must take (section 6). There are 
other features of the convention that could be specified (and perhaps 
some that are offered that could be omitted from the list). There is 
also room for debate about the particular arrangements suggested. 
The key point, though, is that evaluating the proposed amendment 
requires attention to convention and ratification processes. Simply 
providing for voters to call a convention without any advance 
knowledge of how the convention will operate is not a recipe for 
success. 
CONCLUSION 
A constitution that can never be altered or abolished is 
inconsistent with basic principles of popular sovereignty and 
democratic rule. A constitution whose amendment procedures are so 
onerous that in practice they foreclose virtually all modification and 
 
 126.  Id. at 196. 
 127.  See N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2. 
 128.  Benjamin, supra note 51, at 197–200. 
MAZZONE 5.18.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2018  3:46 PM 
2018] AMENDING THE AMENDMENT PROCEDURES 147 
reform is similarly defective. Article V has turned out to be 
incompatible with our own constitutional traditions, which have 
emphasized a healthy skepticism of governing charters rather than 
blind faith in existing institutional arrangements. “The earth belongs 
in usufruct to the living,” Jefferson wrote, and “the dead have neither 
powers nor rights over it.”129 According to Thomas Paine, “every age 
and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages 
and generations which preceded it.”130 Noah Webster warned that 
“[t]he very attempt to make perpetual constitutions, is the assumption 
of a right to control the opinions of future generations; and to 
legislate for those over whom we have as little authority as we have 
over a nation in Asia.”131 Reforming Article V in the manner 
proposed in this Article would return us to a constitutionalism 
marked by ongoing vigilance, informed deliberation, and periodic 
intervention. By putting responsibility for the Constitution back in the 
hands of the citizenry, the proposal would reinvigorate our 
constitutional democracy. 
 
 129.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392, 396 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
 130.  Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man, in THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
PAINE 243, 251 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1961). 
 131.  Noah Webster (as Giles Hickory), On the Absurdity of a Bill of Rights, 1 AM. MAG. 13, 
14 (Dec. 1787). 
